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THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION'S 
PROPOSED REGULATIONS UNDER THE CROWDFUND ACT 
STRIKE A NECESSARY BALANCE BETWEEN THE BURDEN 
OF DISCLOSURE PLACED ON ISSUERS OF SECURITIES AND 
MEANINGFUL PROTECTION FOR UNSOPHISTICATED 
INVESTORS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 5, 2012, Congress enacted the Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups Act (JOBS Act) with the purpose of improving job creation 
and economic growth.) A cornerstone provision of the JOBS Act 
was Title III, Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and 
Unethical Non-Disclosure Act of 2012 (CROWDFUND Act).2 The 
CROWDFUND Act created an exemption to the registration 
requirements for issuing equity securities under the Securities Act of 
1933 (Securities Act).3 The reasoning behind this exemption was to 
relieve small businesses and startup companies from the costly and 
burdensome requirements associated with the issuance of security 
interests under the existing Securities Act.4 However, companies 
wishing to utilize the exemption to raise capital through the Internet 
via the CROWDFUND Act must still comply with the requirements 
of the exemption, which includes disclosure of information to 
potential investors.5 This required disclosure provides some 
protection to the investor by setting a minimum level of information 
relating to the company, its current financial condition, and the 
security offering itself. 6 
Further protection of potential investors in securities under the 
CROWDFUND Act comes from limitations on the amount of 
l. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) 
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The JOBS Act, in part, intended to make 
investment capital available to small businesses and start-up companies unable to 
obtain financing through existing channels. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
2. § 301, 126 Stat. at 315. 
3. Id. § 302, 126 Stat. at 315-16 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012». 
4. See 15 U.S.c. § 77f(describing the registration of securities). 
5. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-l(b). Section 77d(a)(6)(O) requires companies issuing securities 
under the crowdfunding exemption comply with the disclosure requirements 
contained in § 77d-I(b). Id. § 77d(a)(6)(O). 
6. See infra Part IV. 
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securities an issuer may sell to any particular investor. 7 The issuer is 
limited both by the net worth and annual income of the investor and 
the amount invested in any issuance by the issuer under the 
CROWDFUND Act exemption.8 This combination of a limitation on 
sales to individual investors with required issuer disclosures offers 
both a lower cost of disclosure to issuers and protection for the 
investor against losses resulting from fraud or misinformation.9 
In addition to the disclosure requirements codified in the 
CROWDFUND Act, further action by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) is required before the new law can take effect. 10 
Specifically, § 77-1(b)(1)(I) left open the option for the SEC to 
impose additional requirements, beyond those already contained in 
the law, in order to protect investors and the public.ll This particular 
provision led to much discussion in the media as to whether the 
CROWDFUND Act, along with any additional requirements by the 
SEC, would require so much disclosure on the part of small 
businesses and startups that it would render the exemption 
ineffective. 12 
7. 15 u.s.c. § 77d(a)(6)(B) (limiting the total value of securities sold by an issuer to an 
individual investor during any 12-month period); see infra Part III.e. 
8. § 77d(a)(6)(B). 
9. Neither protection of investors from "bad" investments nor assurance of only positive 
investment gains has been the goal of securities regulation. Rather, the goal has been 
to ensure that potential investors receive all the information needed to make a fair 
assessment of the investment opportunity. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or 
Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the Securities Laws-Why the Specially Tailored 
Exemption Must be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.e. L. REv. 1735, 
1741 (2012). 
10. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 303(b), 126 Stat. 306, 
321 (2012). Section 303(b) requires the Commission (SEC) to issue a rulemaking. 
Id. 
11. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-l(b)(I)(I). 
12. See Andrew A. Schwartz, Roundtable: Keep it Light, Chairman White: SEC 
Rulemaking Under the CROWDFUND Act, 66 V AND. L. REv. EN BANC 43, 45-46 
(2013) [hereinafter Roundtable]; Charles D. Vaughn, Crowdfimding: Is the Hype 
Really Justified?, THE DAILY REpORT (Oct. 14, 2013); Carrie Rossenfeld, 
Crowdfunding Has Its Pros and Cons, GLOBEST.COM (Sept. 17, 2013, 8:53 AM), 
http://www.globest.comlnews/12 _ 693/10sangeles/finance/Crowdfunding -Has-Its-
Pros-and-Cons-337672.html; Tammy Whitehouse, JOBS Act Inspires Criticism of 
Regulatory and Governance Rollback, COMPLIANCE WEEK (Mar. 27, 2012), 
http://www.complianceweek.comlnews/news-bulletinljobs-act-inspires-criticism-of-
regulatory-and-govemance-rollback#.V APC2_ldWSo; Yin Wilczek, Former SEC 
Member Questions Viability of JOBS Act Crowdfunding, BLOOMBERG BNA (July 2, 
2013), http://www.bna.comlformer-sec-member-questions-viability-of-jobs-act-
crowdfundingl. 
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On October 23, 2013, the SEC released its proposed rules (SEC 
Rules) covering the CROWDFUND Act for public comment. 13 This 
release offers the first opportunity to examine the SEC's thoughts on 
regulating disclosure under the exemption and any additional 
requirements to be imposed.14 A thorough examination of the SEC 
Rules relating to issuer disclosure under § 4A(b)(1),15 in relation to 
empirical evidence on the types of infonnation most valued by 
potential investors, suggests that the burden created by the required 
disclosures is one for which small businesses and startups have little 
choice but to undertake should they desire a successful offering under 
the CROWDFUND Act exemption. 16 
The rules proposed by the SEC limit the cost and burden to small 
businesses and startups through the CROWDFUND Act exemption, 
while preserving investor protection through specific required 
disclosure and the additional structural limitation on investor 
participation. 17 Part II of this Comment discusses what is meant by 
"crowdfunding" securities and provides background on the need and 
purpose behind the CROWDFUND Act, as well as some of the 
benefits and potential disadvantages to the practice. 18 In Part III, key 
requirements of the exemption for crowdfunding are presented along 
with a discussion of empirical evidence highlighting types of 
infonnation most valuable to investors when deciding whether or not 
to purchase securities under crowdfunding. 19 Part IV examines the 
rules proposed by the SEC governing the issuance of securities 
utilizing the crowdfunding exemption within the context of required 
disclosure by potential investors and issuing companies. 20 Part V 
summarizes the likely impact of the SEC's proposed rules on the 
13. Crowd funding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 (proposed Oct. 23, 2013) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240); see also SEC Issues Proposal on Crowdfimding, 
U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 23, 2013), 
http://www. sec.gov IN ewslPressReleaselDetaillPressRelease/ 13 705400 17677#. UtA4G 
2R4aBU. 
14. Until the release of the proposed rules by the SEC, commentary on the likely effects 
of the CROWD FUND Act were based on speculation and came with the caveat that 
until the SEC acted no one could be sure of how burdensome the disclosure 
requirements might be on small businesses and startups. Rossenfeld, supra note 12. 
IS. Section 4A(b)(I) of JOBS Act, § 302,126 Stat. at 315-16 refers to the Securities Act 
of 1933 (Securities Act) as amended by the CROWDFUND Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-l. 
16. See infra Part III.B. 
17. See infra Part IV. 
18. See infra Part II. 
19. See infra Part III. 
20. See infra Part IV. 
130 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 44 
viability of crowdfunding under the exemption to small businesses 
and startup companies and examines the balance achieved between 
the burden of disclosure on the issuer and investor protection.21 
II. CROWDFUNDING EQUITY SECURITIES 
A. Background 
The notion of crowdfunding security interests as a form of capital 
financing for businesses arose out of the already ubiquitous practice 
of crowdsourcing.22 Crowdsourcing utilizes the power of the Internet 
to reach out to the public at large and solicit small amounts of 
funding from many investors in order to raise enough capital to 
commence a project.23 These projects have included activities such 
as the creation of a t-shirt, a novel design for a smartphone case, or a 
new musical album, mostly within the creative arts realm. 24 In 
exchange for monetary donations to the requesting company, the 
payer receives either one of the first offerings of the item, the item at 
a lower than retail price, or some other incentive other than any type 
of security interest in the company creating the project.25 Websites 
such as Kickstarter.com and Sellaband.com facilitate the setup of 
these projects and provide a place for willing "investors" to search 
out projects they wish to fund. 26 Currently, crowdsourcing can be 
broken down into four main categories based on what the investor 
receives in return for his contribution: donation-based, reward-based, 
lending, and equity.27 At the time of this writing, the Securities Act 
prohibits equity investment in such projects.28 
21. See infra Part V. 
22. Joan MacLeod Heminway & Sheldon Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: 
Crowdfonding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REv. 879, 881 (2011) 
(quoting Paul Belleflamme et aI., Crowdfonding: Tapping the Right Crowd 29 J. Bus. 
VENTURING 585, 586 (Feb. 21, 2011)) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssm.comlabstract= 1578175); Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 
88 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1457, 1459 (2013). 
23. Ajay K. Agrawal et aI., Some Simple Economics of Crowdfonding, 14 INNOVATION 
POL'y & ECON. 63, 65 (2014); see also Ethan Mollick, The Dynamics of 
Crowdfonding: An Exploratory Study, 29 J. Bus. VENTURING 1, 1-3 (2013) 
(discussing the "Pebble" smart watch project). 
24. See Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1458-59. 
25. See id. at 1459. 
26. See KrCKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2014); 
SELLABAND, http://www.sellaband.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2014). 
27. Gerrit K.C. Ahlers et aI., Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding 6 (Oct. 14, 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.com!abstract=2161587. 
28. See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1,6. The JOBS Act and subsequent passage of the SEC's rules 
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Unlike crowdsourced projects where the public funder receives an 
actual product in return for his investment, an investor in 
crowdfunded equity securities will actually acquire a security interest 
in the company.29 This ownership interest would potentially allow 
the investor to receive dividends based on their security ownership 
and to participate in a public offering of the company, should such an 
event occur in the future. 
The offering of a security interest, or anything that translated into a 
share of profits, through one of these crowdsource web sites would 
potentially require regulation under the Securities Act if the offering 
met the definition of an "investment contract" under the Howey test.30 
Applying Howey using a five-prong analysis, commentators 
Heminway and Hoffman concluded that it is likely a court would find 
a crowdfunded security interest to be an "investment contract."3! 
The existing regulatory framework under the Securities Act was 
created with investor protection as a primary policy concern. 32 Under 
a crowdfunding investment scheme, investor protection becomes an 
even greater concern as the transaction involves both a high degree of 
investment risk33 and a pool of unsophisticated investors. 34 The key 
to creating a viable exemption for crowdfunded securities is to keep 
related to the CROWD FUND Act exemption will end this prohibition on equity-based 
crowdfunding; supra Part 1. 
29. Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1459-60. This acquired interest in the assets and profits 
of the issuer brings these offerings under the regulatory umbrella of the Securities Act 
ofl933. 15 U.S.c. § 77b(a)(l) (2012). 
30. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 2(a)(1), 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 77b(a)(l) (2012»; see SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 
(1946) (setting out the test to determine when an investment scheme is considered an 
"investment contract" under § 2(a)(l) of the Securities Act of 1933); Stuart R. Cohn, 
The New Crowdfunding Registration Exemption: Good Idea, Bad Execution, 64 FLA. 
L. REv. 1433, 1435 (2012). 
31. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 22, at 904. The five prongs used in the analysis 
are (1) contract, transaction, or scheme, (2) investment of money, (3) common 
enterprise, (4) expectation of profits, and (5) solely from the efforts of others. Id. 
892-904. After examining each prong in the context of a crowd funded security, the 
authors conclude that each prong is likely to be satisfied by such an offering. Jd. 
32. See id. at 927. 
33. See C. Steven Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption: Promise 
Unfulfilled, 40 SEC. REG. LJ. 195, 196 (2012). "[I]nvesting in small business, 
particularly at the startup stage, is inherently risky. The potential for fraud and self-
dealing is high .... " Jd. There is an additional risk of a lack of liquidity as well. Id. 
34. See id. The term "unsophisticated investor" applies to the general public, and 
assumes a low level of financial sophistication as compared to sophisticated or 
accredited investors. Id. 
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disclosure costs low, while protecting the unsophisticated investorY 
The informational asymmetry between the issuer and the 
unsophisticated investor will be different, and likely greater, in the 
context of equity crowdfunding than III other forms of 
crowdfunding.36 
In order to best protect investors, meaningful disclosure on the part 
of the issuing company is required.37 This is no different for the 
crowdfunded security than it is for other types of securities, and 
meaningful disclosure was a primary focus of the existing securities 
laws.38 Because those investors choosing to invest via crowdfunding 
are "subject to an unusually high degree of risk,"39 the need for 
adequate disclosure of information about the company remains of 
paramount importance.4o 
B. Benefits of Crowdfunding and the Exemption 
Why, given the added risks surrounding crowd funded offerings, 
was there such a push to create a mechanism by which companies 
could sell equity securities to the public through crowdfunding? The 
short answer is job creation and economic development.41 For a 
company looking to finance capital to start or grow their business, 
crowdfunding offers several advantages over more traditional sources 
of funding, primarily a lower cost of acquiring capital and access to 
information.42 
The lower cost of acquiring capital through crowdfunded securities 
may be due, in part, to a better match between the company and those 
35. See id. at 196-98. 
36. Ahlers et aI., supra note 27, at 6; see also Agrawal et aI., supra note 23, at 68 ("In 
general, the most critical differences between equity and non equity crowdfunding will 
arise due to the amplification of information asymmetries."). 
37. Hazen, supra note 9, at 1737. 
38. See id. at 1741-42. Rather than focusing on the merits of investments, securities laws 
favor disclosure as a mechanism to ensure sufficiently informed investors. Id. at 
1741. 
39. Agrawal et aI., supra note 23, at 68. 
40. See Hazen, supra note 9, at 1769. 
41. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012); see 
also 157 CONGo REc. S188,8458 (daily ed. Dec. 8,2011) (statement of Sen. Jeff 
Merkley) ("Low-dollar investments from ordinary Americans may help fill the void, 
providing a new avenue of funding to the small businesses that are the engine of job 
creation. The CROWDFUND Act would provide startup companies and other small 
businesses with a new way to raise capital from ordinary investors in a more 
transparent and regulated marketplace. "). 
42. Agrawal et aI., supra note 23, at 71-72. 
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investors willing to back their venture. 43 Geographic discrepancies 
among small, young companies and investors become less of a 
barrier when the potential group of investors is enlarged to include 
anyone with Internet access. 44 Also potentially lowering the cost of 
capital is the ability to "bundle" the sale of equity securities with 
other types of rewards, should intermediaries support such an 
option.45 Finally, disclosure of more information under the 
CROWDFUND Act could lead to a greater willingness to pay on the 
part of investors, thus reducing the cost to issuers of acquiring 
capital.46 
Another possible benefit to companies choosing crowdfunding may 
be the ability to increase their access to information about their 
product or business.47 Similar to market-based research, 
crowdfunding may provide relevant information about the product, 
establish a pre-production market, and increase the likelihood of 
success.48 
One of the main advantages of crowdfunding is that the costs of 
crowdfunding will likely be lower versus traditional securities 
offerings or initial public offerings (IPOS).49 Crowdfunding should 
allow for the cost of raising capital from the public through the sale 
of equity to become a viable method for startup companies and 
smaller businesses. 50 Though the ability to raise funds through public 
offerings has been available under SEC Regulation D,5l such 
offerings, have only realistically been available to accredited 
investors. 52 
43. Id. at 71. 
44. Id; see also Mollick, supra note 23, at 14 (noting that crowd funding helps to diminish 
traditional geographic limitations by enabling online communities to participate in 
investments). 
45. Agrawal et ai., supra note 23, at 71. Other rewards which may be bundled with 
securities include early product access, limited-edition products, and investor 
recognition. Id. 
46. Id. at 71; see infra note 120 and accompanying text. 
47. Agrawal et ai., supra note 23, at 72. 
48. ld. 
49. Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1467. 
50. Id 
51. Id at 1467-68. Regulation D sets forth the regulations issued by the SEC that 
governs the securities that do not need to be registered under the Securities Act of 
1933. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.500-.508 (2013). 
52. Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1468. SEC Regulation D, in addition to state specific 
Blue Sky Laws, has limited public offerings to accredited investors and allowed for 
only private offerings with no advertising or "general solicitation." ld. 
134 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REvIEW Vol. 44 
The high cost of traditional offerings stems from compliance with 
regulation and registration laws53 and the cost of promotion. 54 These 
costs can be especially burdensome for small-scale issuances of 
securities, as the costs are not proportional to the size of the offering, 
but are based instead only on regulatory requirements. 55 One of the 
potential positive aspects of crowdfunded offerings under the 
proposed exemption is a lower regulatory and registration burden 
than the one under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.56 In 
addition, promotion of the offering within the crowdfunding context 
should be simpler through the use of the Internet and the availability 
of intermediaries at all hours. 57 Despite this expectation of lower 
cost, a significant burden remains 58 as disclosure of information to 
potential investors is required in order to take advantage of the 
exemption for crowdfunding.59 
C. Potential Negative Impacts of Crowdfunding on the Issuer 
Although the benefits of raising capital through crowdfunding have 
been lauded, there exist potential negative impacts beyond mere 
disclosure requirements.6o These negative impacts are more generally 
applicable to the funding of capital through the issuance of equity.61 
While a thorough discussion of these impacts is beyond the scope of 
this Comment, they are briefly noted to present a more complete 
picture of the advantages and disadvantages of acquiring capital 
through the issuance of crowdfunded securities. In some instances, 
the negative impact may be amplified by the use of crowdfunding 
and the platform on which it is built.62 
53. Id. at 1470. 
54. Id. at 1468. 
55. Id. at 1470. For example, preparation of a registration statement-required regardless 
of the size of the issuance--can require as much as 1200 hours of work. Id. at 1469. 
56. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.6a-l (2013). Whether or not these costs are in fact lower under 
the exemption hinges on the proposed SEC rules. See infra Part IV. 
57. Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1471. 
58. Id. at 1472. 
59. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-l(b)(1) (2012); Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1472; see also infra 
Part IV. 
60. See Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1477-80. 
61. See id. at 1483-87 (explaining that the sale of equity creates fiduciary duties, exposes 
directors and officers to the risk of personal liability, and empowers purchasers with 
certain statutory rights). 
62. See id. at 1478-79 (noting that Internet-facilitated communications increase the risk 
and likelihood of proxy contests). Crowdfunding relies on the Internet and its ability 
to connect those with a common interest yet separated by physical location. Id. at 
1471. Regarding some negative impacts, as viewed by the issuer of the security, 
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One disadvantage that may be heightened through crowdfunding is 
the hostile takeover,63 as proxy fights will be cheaper and easier to 
coordinate over the Intemet.64 Another is the tender offer, where a 
person, group, or competitor becomes the majority shareholder by 
purchasing the shares of other shareholders.65 
In addition to increased potential for takeovers, several other 
disadvantages exist from issuing equity through crowdfunding.66 
These potentially negative consequences include shareholder 
derivative suits,67 demand by investors for company books and 
records,68 disgruntled shareholders and lack of a secondary market,69 
and voting rights for shareholders. 70 
The disadvantages noted above involve complex considerations for 
any company deciding whether to issue equity shares, through either 
crowdfunding or any other registered or exempt offering. A more 
thorough discussion is beyond the scope of this Comment. Part III 
discusses the exemption for crowd funding and examines the types of 
information most valued by investors when making an investment 
decision. 
associated with funding capital through sale of equity, the ability for equity holders to 
communicate and coalesce via the Internet increases the risk to the issuer. Id. at 
1486-87. 
63. A takeover is "[t]he acquisition of ownership or control of a corporation ... typically 
accomplished by a purchase of shares or assets, a tender offer, or a merger." BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1591 (9th ed. 2009). A taker over is considered hostile when it is 
"resisted by the target corporation." Id. 
64. Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1477-78. These proxy battles are not governed by federal 
laws, as those laws cover only registered securities. Id. at 1478. 
65. Id. at 1479. Though coercive takeovers have since been regulated, and two-tier tender 
offers effectively banned, those prohibitions apply only to registered securities. Id. at 
1480. 
66. Id. 1483-84. 
67. Id. 1483. The potential for derivative suits may necessitate the added cost of 
directors' and officers' insurance to cover liability. Id. at 1483-84. 
68. Id. at 1486-87. Shareholder demands for access to company books and records have 
the possibility ofleaking confidential corporate information. Id. at 1485-86. 
69. Id. at 1486-87. "[D]isgruntled shareholders are more likely to petition management 
for change in the context of crowd funded securities than has traditionally been the 
case for public companies." Id. at 1487. Furthermore, shareholders are restricted 
from selling their shares on any secondary market for a period of one year after 
purchase unless the transfer of securities satisfies one of the four exceptions under this 
provision. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-I(e) (2012). 
70. Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1487. 
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III. EXEMPTING CROWD FUNDED EQUITY SECURITIES 
One of the intended benefits resulting from crowdfunding is a 
decreased cost to issuing equity.71 Without the exemption for 
crowdfunded securities, offering anything that translated into a share 
of profits would potentially require regulation under the Securities 
Act of 1933 (Securities Act) if the offering met the definition of a 
security under the Howey test.72 Traditional securities, under which 
crowdfunded securities would fall if not exempted, face a system of 
heavy and burdensome regulation. 73 In addition, companies selling 
securities under the Securities Act are required to register and comply 
with the regulatory process, or face liability for fraud or false and 
misleading information. 74 The expenses associated with such a 
registration-which include accounting, legal, and other fees-make 
this prohibitively expensive for small businesses.75 The typical filing 
of a registration with the SEC, even for a small offering, can be as 
much as $100,000. 76 
Small businesses, however, existed prior to the Internet and the 
arrival of crowdfunding.77 While Regulation D of the SEC contains 
exemptions for small businesses from the prohibitive registration 
costs of the current system,78 an exemption under Regulation D 
would not be feasible within the crowdfunding context.79 Exempted 
offerings under Rules 504, 505, and 506 of Regulation D contain 
several provisions restricting their applicability to crowdfunded 
securities.80 The provisions include a ban on general solicitation, a 
71. See supra Part II.B. 
72. See Cohn, supra note 30, at 1435; see also supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
73. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 22, at 908. 
74. Id. See § 77k of the Securities Act, which provides a purchaser with a cause of action 
against the seller in the case of misleading or omitted statements of material fact in 
any part of the registration. 15 U.S.c. § 77k(a) (2012). 
75. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 22, at 909-10. 
76. Id. at 909. The initial registration with the SEC includes underwriting, fees to the 
SEC, legal and accounting fees, cost of printing, and various other fees. Id. at 908. 
77. See id. at 880-81. 
78. Hazen, supra note 9, at 1744-46. 
79. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 22, at 913. 
80. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504-.506 (2013). Regulation D refers to § 77a et seq. of the 
Securities Act of 1933, which exempts certain transactions. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012); 
17 C.F.R. § 230.500(a) (2013). Rule 504 prohibits exemptions where transactions are 
based on solicitation. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(4); 17 C.F.R. § 230.504. Rule 505 exempts 
transactions with only accredited investors, and only if there is no advertising or 
public solicitation. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(5); 17 C.F.R. § 230.505. Under Rule 506, all 
transactions would be subject to the full disclosure requirements under § 77d-lb. 15 
U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. 
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maximum of thirty-five purchasers, and a requirement that disclosure 
of specific financial and non-financial information be made to non-
accredited investors. 81 Certainly the unsophisticated investor whom 
the small business wishes to target its crowdfunding efforts is not an 
accredited investor,82 and thus the exemption from the burdensome 
registration and disclosure process is unattainable. 
A. Key Requirements of the Exemption 
A primary purpose behind creating the exemption for 
crowdfunding was to allow for small, otherwise insignificant 
investment in small companies. 83 Notwithstanding, meaningful 
disclosure must be a part of the exemption-this includes risks, 
obligations, benefits, financial history, and information about the 
business that are necessary for investors to evaluate the merits of 
investment. 84 As Hazen stated, "the impersonal nature of the Internet 
would seem to call for more, rather than less, investor protection."85 
These investors are likely unsophisticated and are strangers to the 
business with no additional information to that which is available 
over the Internet. 86 In this regard, "social media technologies 
increase rather than decrease the potential for fraud" and further 
highlights the need for adequate disclosure. 87 
The question moving forward is, to what extent does the exemption 
for crowdfunding increase the viability of small businesses raising 
capital through the sale of security interests? Do the disclosure 
requirements differ substantially from those under the traditional 
offerings? 
81. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 22, at 918; see also Hazen supra note 9, at 1748-
49; supra note 80. 
82. An "accredited investor" is one who meets the definition under Rule 501(a) of 
Regulation D. 17 C.F.R. 230.501(a) (2013). For natural persons, Rule 501(a) 
specifies an accredited investor as a person: (1) "whose individual net worth, or joint 
net worth with that person's spouse, exceeds $1,000,000," excluding the value of the 
person's primary residence; or (2) "who had an individual income in excess of 
$200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income with that person's 
spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of those years and has a reasonable expectation 
of reaching the same income level in the current year." 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)-
(6). 
83. Cohn, supra note 30, at 1434. 
84. Hazen, supra note 9, at 1753. 
85. Id. at 1766. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 1769. 
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The proposed requirements under the CROWDFUND Act and 
comments regarding those proposals highlight the existing tension 
between investor protection and the cost of raising capital through 
crowdfunding.88 Efforts to protect the investor may leave the small 
business facing costs for registration and meeting ongoing regulatory 
requirements that effectively erase any benefit from being able to 
issue the securities. 89 The recently released regulations proposed by 
the SEC covering the crowdfunding exemption offer one indication 
of just how costly compliance with the exemption may ultimately 
be.90 
Prior to the release of the SEC's proposed rules, some authors 
expressed a desire for the SEC to keep the exemption for 
crowdfunding simple and streamlined to allow it to achieve the goal 
of providing a low cost alternative for raising small capital. 91 With 
the release of the proposed rules, it appears the SEC was listening. 
B. Disclosure Information Relevant to Investors - Empirical 
Evidence 
Given the desire to create a workable exemption for crowdfunding 
that both protects the investor from unscrupulous and fraudulent 
issuers and imposes a reasonable burden of disclosure on the issuer,92 
it becomes important to investigate which pieces of information are 
most relevant to the investment decision.93 Are the disclosure 
requirements under the CROWDFUND Act exemption in accord 
with what the unsophisticated investor would or should want to know 
in order to make an informed investment decision? If so, are the 
proposed regulations issued by the SEC likely to increase or decrease 
the burden of disclosure on small business wishing to utilize the 
exemption? Two recent empirical studies have examined the factors 
influencing investment decisions within the crowdfunding context. 
In Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding, Ahlers and authors 
investigate which signals by small start-up companies lead investors 
to purchase equity securities through crowdfunding.94 The authors 
88. Jd. at 1767. 
89. See id. at 1738. 
90. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428,66,509 (proposed Oct. 23, 2013) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200,227,232,239,240) ("[T]he average cost of achieving initial 
regulatory compliance for an initial public offering is $2.5 million, followed by an 
ongoing compliance cost, once public, of $1.5 million per year. "). 
91. Roundtable, supra note 12, at 52. 
92. See supra Parts ILA, lILA. 
93. See Ahlers et aI., supra note 27, at 1-2. 
94. Jd. at 3. 
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acknowledge that both "the mechanisms and dynamics of 
crowdfunding are not yet well understood. "95 However, by 
looking at data based on existing investment decisions within a 
crowdfunded context, the authors are able to make some conclusions 
regarding the influence of several types of disclosed information.96 
Outside of the United States, equity crowdfunding has become 
increasingly important as an alternative means for raising capital for 
small businesses or start-ups.97 The volume of equity crowdfunding 
has doubled every year since 2009, and in 2011, start-ups around the 
world raised an estimated $88 million in funding. 98 This funding 
came from small investors who typically do not have the ability to 
thoroughly research potential investment decisions.99 In order to 
successfully raise capital, small businesses and start-ups must 
"signal," or disclose, to investors that they have a value worthy of 
investment. 100 The signaling by these companies is equivalent to the 
disclosure required under the CROWDFUND Act exemption. 101 
Disclosure has, at its core, the goal of ensuring that investors are well 
informed about the company in which they may choose to purchase 
securities and, as such, presents a signal of their value. 102 
95. ld. at 1. 
96. ld. at 3. 
97. Jd. at 1. As crowdfunding within the United States has only recently become feasible 
through the JOBS Act, markets outside the United States are used to examine equity 
funding through crowdfunded means. See id. at 1-3. 
98. Jd. 
99. ld. This reference to small investors equates to the unsophisticated investor 
referenced elsewhere in this Comment and the literature. 
100. ld. 
101. Compare Ahlers et aI., supra note 27, at 1-3 (finding start-ups that signal, or disclose, 
the following information attract higher numbers of investors: financial forecasts and 
disclaimers, a long history of being in business prior to seeking equity crowdfunding, 
a high number of board members, a high number of board members that hold an MBA 
degree, better networks, and an intention to seek an exit by either an IPO or trade sale 
rather than by other modes of exit), with infra Part IV (noting that the CROWDFUND 
Act exemption requires disclosure of the following information: a list of executive 
officers, a description of the business in the form ofa business plan, information about 
the company's use of proceeds and existing capital, and a financial statement 
including a narrative discussion of the company's financial situation). 
102. See Ahlers et aI., supra note 27, at 1 (explaining that in order for start-ups to 
successfully raise funds through crowdfunding, they must clearly disclose their value 
to small investors, who often comprise the main source of support for many start-ups); 
Ross S. Weinstein, Note, Crowdfunding in the u.s. & Abroad: What to Expect When 
You're Expecting, 46 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 427, 434-35 (2013) (disclosing information 
provides investors with a straightforward way to assess the value of their potential 
investment, determine the risks involved, and avoid fraud). 
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Additionally, the type of signaling most effective for the small 
investor is likely different than that for angel investors or venture 
capitalists. 103 
An analysis of which signals are important to small investors was 
performed using data on offerings from the Australian Small Scale 
Offerings Boards (ASSOB).I04 From these offerings, six types of 
data were collected: basic information, financial statements, external 
certifications, board experience, history of investment, and the speed 
of investment. 105 Using this data, the authors estimated several 
models for predicting whether an investor would invest in the 
security being offered. 106 The estimation of the model produced 
coefficients indicating the relative effect of each type of data on the 
decision to invest. 107 
Based upon the ASSOB data, start-ups with a larger number of 
board members, higher levels of education,108 and better networks 
were more likely to have successful offerings. 109 In addition, 
companies signaling their intention to offer an IPO in the future or 
seek acquisition by another company, as opposed to other exit 
strategies, had an increased likelihood of attracting investors. llo 
Companies who did not provide financial forecasts were less likely to 
attract investment and tended to raise less overall capital over an 
extended period of time. III Finally, companies that had been in 
business for some time prior to entering the equity crowdfunding 
market were more likely to reach their capital goals. ll2 This suggests 
that new small businesses and recent start-ups could, regardless of 
disclosure, face a difficult time generating capital through equity 
crowdfunding. 
Overall, the study based on the ASSOB data indicates that 
"financial roadmaps (such as preplanned IPO or acquisition exit 
103. See Ahlers et aI., supra note 27, at 2. Angel investors and venture capitalists are 
experienced, seasoned investors who are deemed sophisticated and therefore less 
likely to fall prey to offerings based on fraud or misrepresentation. See id. 
104. Id. at 3. The authors looked at data from 104 offerings from the Australian Small 
Scale Offerings Board ("AS SOB") between October 2006 and October 2011. Id. 
105. Id. at 13. 
106. Id. at 39. 
107. Id. at 39-40. 
108. Education levels were "measured by the percentage of board members holding an 
MBA degree." Id. at 3. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. Other exit strategies included leveraged buyouts and reverse takeovers, or no 
indicated exit strategy. Id. at 43. 
111. Id.at3. 
112. Id. 
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strategies) and risk factors (such as amount of equity offered and 
whether financial forecasts are provided)," and board experience are 
important pieces of information to potential investors. 113 Disclosure 
of these items by the issuer would seem to be necessary regardless of 
any burden imposed by their requirement under the exemption. 
In The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, Ethan 
Mollick predicts the effects of various types of information on 
investment decisions for crowdfunded equity securities. 114 
Acknowledging the importance of crowdfunding and its emergence 
as a growing area for entrepreneurs, Mollick sought to explore the 
potential for this newly viable method for capital funding. 115 He 
suggests that crowdfunded projects "mostly succeed by narrow 
margins, or else fail by large amounts.""6 Success for the issuer of 
crowdfunded equity seems to be connected to project quality, because 
these higher quality projects are more likely to result in greater 
funding. 117 Additionally, and in conjunction with the Internet-based 
form of crowdfunding, companies with a larger number of friends 
and social network presence are more likely to have successful 
offerings. 118 
Mollick defines crowdfunding as "an open call, essentially through 
the Internet, for the provision of financial resources either in form of 
donation or in exchange for some form of reward and/or voting rights 
in order to support initiatives for specific purposes.""9 Whether 
crowdfunding becomes an alternative for more traditional methods of 
financing remains to be seen; however, it may in the very least 
provide a vehicle by which to follow the more established funding 
routes. 120 
As crowdfunding within the United States was not permitted, and 
remains so until the SEC regulations are finalized, Mollick used 
113. ld. at 30. 
114. See Mollick, supra note 23, at 1-2. 
115. Jd.atl. 
116. Jd. at 2. 
117. ld. 
118. ld. 
119. ld. (quoting Armin Schwienbacher & Benjamin Larralde, Crowdfunding of Small 
Entrepreneurial Ventures, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE 
369,371 (Douglas Cumming ed., 2012)). 
120. See id. at 3. Mollick gives, as an example, the recent successful Kickstarter campaign 
by the makers of the "Pebble" smart watch that led to the receipt of venture capital 
after being initially rejected. ld. 
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crowdsourcing data extracted from the Kickstarter website. 121 
Though not able to offer equity securities through crowdfunding, 
Kickstarter uses a patronage and reward model to allow companies to 
generate capital to fund their projects. 122 In addition, Kickstarter 
provided the inspiration for the recent JOBS Act legislation and the 
creation of the CROWDFUND Act exemption. 123 In this regard, 
Kickstarter provides a useful model for demonstrating what 
information is most relevant in the crowdfunding context. 124 
As noted in the previous article, signaling within the crowdfunding 
context represents a critical exchange of information between the 
issuer and investor. 125 "Since investments are uncertain, investors 
often need to act on partial information about particular ventures."126 
Thus, potential signals of quality may be especially important for 
start-up ventures and small businesses, where information about the 
company may be obscure or unreliable. 127 Quality, as signaled to 
investors, was measured by the preparedness of the Kickstarter 
project pitches. 128 Project pitches included videos relating to the 
projects and project updates with textual descriptions. 129 In 
measuring preparedness based on the project pitches, Mollick also 
considered spelling errors within the text. 130 A quality project pitch, 
both in terms of professional looking videos with relevant updates 
and grammatical correctness, provides a signal to the potential 
investor that the issuer is concerned with quality and likely represents 
a better investment than one who does not. 131 
Along with quality, in an era of Internet based funding, the size of 
the social network associated with the company seeking funds also 
121. Id. at 4. Kickstarter was the largest, and most dominant, crowdfunding site at the time 




125. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
126. Mollick, supra note 23, at 7. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 8. Preparedness equates to the degree to which the project founders adhered to 
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influences success. 132 Network size was measured based on the 
number of Facebook friends of the project founders. 133 
Estimating the relevance of signals of quality and their effect on 
successful funding, Mollick concludes that investors do assess the 
potential of the founders seeking crowdfunding of their projects. 134 
In addition, the importance of geography as it relates to the location 
of the company and the investor (funder) is reduced.135 Despite being 
only a small business or start-up, the fact that the company is not 
located near the investor does not reduce the likelihood of 
investment, as it might under a more traditional funding 
methodology. 136 
Mollick uncovers several clear lessons for companies considering 
crowdfunding their projects. Quality is key, and ways in which to 
signal high quality to the potential funder should be considered. 137 
The company should also set appropriate goals that allow for 
delivering the product on time and careful planning both in setting 
these goals and in executing them. 138 Though these results are 
directly applicable within the Kickstarter project context of a 
company raising funds to make a product, they are also relevant in 
examining disclosure within the equity crowdfunding context. 
Signaling within the Kickstarter framework is analogous to 
disclosure under an equity crowdfunding scenario, as it provides 
relevant investment information to the potential investor. The results 
of Mollick's study may be applied to what is disclosed by issuers of 
crowdfunded equity securities. Disclosure of goal setting and plans 
for product creation within the more traditional crowdfunding model 
are no different than a sound business model and path for growth 
which would be outlined in disclosure documents by a company 
offering the sale of securities. 
132. ld.; see also Alhers et aI., supra note 27, at 3 (noting that companies in business for 
some time prior to seeking crowd funding were more likely to be successful at raising 
funds, and success may have been due, in part, to having an existing social network). 
133. Mollick, supra note 23, at 8. Within the estimation of the econometric model, 
network size was calculated as the log of the number of Facebook friends. ld. 
134. Id. at 14. 
135. ld. 
136. See id. 
137. ld. 
138. ld. 
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C. Capping Investor Exposure Under the CROWDFUND Act 
In addition to the required issuer disclosure under the 
CROWDFUND Act, "the Act [also] includes a structural protection 
for investors that limits their potential losses."J39 This protection 
takes the form of limiting the total aggregate amount of securities an 
issuer can sell to a given investor in a twelve-month period. 140 The 
aggregate amount allowed for investment is based on a tiered system 
taking into account the annual income and net worth of the individual 
investor. 141 This tiered system effectively sets the upper limit that 
any individual may invest in crowd funded securities during any 
twelve-month period at $5,000. 142 Thus, the very structure of the 
CROWDFUND Act exemption attempts to limit the potential losses 
to an investor by capping the aggregate amount invested. 143 
One issue raised by this structural protection has been how to 
monitor the aggregate amount invested. 144 While the CROWDFUND 
Act does not specify any method for ensuring compliance with this 
provision, it is likely that the private sector will create a solution. 145 
However, until such a system has been adopted, it will fall upon the 
issuer to make certain that the individual investors to whom they 
issue securities have not exceeded their aggregate amount. 146 
139. Roundtable, supra note 12, at 50; see 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B) (2012). 
140. § 77d(a)(6)(B). 
14l. The relevant aggregate amount allowed is determined as 
Jd. 
(B) the aggregate amount sold to any investor by an issuer, 
including any amount sold in reliance on the exemption provided 
under this paragraph during the 12-month period preceding the 
date of such transaction, does not exceed-
(i) the greater of $2,000 or 5 percent of the annual income 
or net worth of such investor, as applicable, if either the 
annual income or the net worth of the investor is less than 
$100,000; and 
(ii) 10 percent of the annual income or net worth of such 
investor, as applicable, not to exceed a maximum 
aggregate amount sold of $100,000, if either the annual 
income or net worth of the investor is equal to or more 
than $100,000[.] 
142. Roundtable, supra note 12, at 50-5l. 
143. Id. 
144. Hazen, supra note 9, at 175l. 
145. Thaya Brook Knight et aI., Comment, A Very Quiet Revolution: A Primer on 
Securities Crowdfunding and Title III of the JOBS Act, 2 MICH. J. PRIVATE EQUITY & 
VENTURE CAP. L. 135, 143 (2012). 
146. Jd. 
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Perhaps more importantly, concern for whether or not this 
structural requirement will in fact protect the unsophisticated investor 
from fr~lUdulent offerings has been raised. 147 The assumption that, by 
merely limiting investors to small amounts, fraud will be deterred is 
misplaced. 148 "Even limiting the exemption to relatively small 
amounts such as $250 or $500 does not mean that there is an 
insufficient investor-protection stake such that scrutiny is not 
warranted."149 
However, others have acknowledged the need for balance between 
the burden of disclosure on issuers and the protection of investors. 150 
"To minimize investor losses without unduly increasing the cost to 
issuers, investors should be protected not through complicated, 
expensive mandatory disclosure requirements, but through less costly 
structural requirements."151 The cost, however, of implementing and 
monitoring this tiered system may be large. 152 Despite this potential 
cost, it is also important to consider the benefits stemming from this 
approach in the context of the entire exemption. 153 
Thus, the capping of aggregate investment by any individual 
investor provides a structural balance to the disclosure required by 
the issuer. This provision, as with the exemption itself, is subject to 
regulatory guidance by the SEC. 154 Whether or not the necessary 
balance exists is dependent on how the SEC handles compliance. 
IV. THE SEC PROPOSED REGULATIONS 
On October 23, 2013, the SEC released for public comment the 
proposed regulations for exempting crowdfunded securities offerings 
under the JOBS Act revision to the Securities Act of 1933. 155 In 
releasing the proposed regulations, the potential impact of the 
disclosure requirements on small businesses may be evaluated. 156 
147. Hazen, supra note 9, at 1765-66. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 1765. 
150. Bradford, supra note 33, at 198; see also Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 22, at 
953. 
151. Bradford, supra note 33, at 198. 
152. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 22, at 953. 
153. Id. 
154. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
155. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 (proposed Oct. 23, 20l3) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, & 249). 
156. See John S. Wroldsen, The Crowdfund Act's Strange Bedfellows: Democracy and 
Start-Up Company Investing, 62 U. KAN. L. REv. 357, 372 (20l3) ("The Crowdfund 
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The proposed regulations cover the entirety of the new exemption, 157 
which includes the creation of and regulations for intermediaries to 
act as brokers or exchanges between the issuing companies and the 
investors. However, the following discussion focuses on the 
disclosure requirements for the issuing company and the costs of 
compliance as a potential deterrent from utilizing the exemption. 
Disclosure requirements for businesses wishing to issue securities 
under the exemption for crowdfunding amends the Securities Act of 
1933 by adding § 4A, which corresponds to § 302 of the JOBS Act. 15S 
Specifications for issuer disclosure are contained in § 4A(b)(1).'59 
Some of the items required for disclosure are the name, address, and 
website of the issuer; a descriptioI\ of the business; the financial 
condition of the business; the purpose or intended use of the 
requested funds; and a description of the ownership and capital 
structure of the business. 160 Additionally, under § 4A(b) (1 )(1), the 
Act's ongoing disclosure requirement breaks new ground in regulating the 
relationship between investors and managers of small companies."). 
157. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428,66,431-37. 
158. See id. at 66,428. The SEC is "proposing new rules and forms to implement 
Securities Act Sections 4(a)(6) and 4A and Exchange Act Sections 3(h) and 12(g)(6)." 
Id. at 66,430. 
159. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-l(b)(I) (2012); Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,437-38. 
160. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,437-38. The full list of disclosed items as 
presented includes: 
• The name, legal status, physical address and Web 
site address of the issuer; 
• The names of the directors and officers (and any 
persons occupying a similar status or performing a 
similar function), and each person holding more than 
20 percent of the shares of the issuer; 
• a description of the business of the issuer and the 
anticipated business plan of the issuer; 
• a description of the financial condition of the issuer; 
• a description of the stated purpose and intended use 
of the proceeds of the offering sought by the issuer 
with respect to the target offering amount; 
• the target offering amount, the deadline to reach the 
target offering amount and regular updates regarding 
the progress of the issuer in meeting the target 
offering amount; 
• the price to the public of the securities or the method 
for determining the price; and 
• a description of the ownership and capital structure 
of the issuer. 
Id. at 66,438 (footnotes omitted). 
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SEC may require additional disclosures in order to protect investors 
and the public interest. 161 
The SEC acknowledged community concern with respect to the 
disclosure and its burden, stating that "[ c ]ommenters expressed 
concerns about the extent of the disclosure requirements and stated 
that overly burdensome rules would make offers and sales in reliance 
on Section 4(a)(6) prohibitively expensive. We recognize these 
concerns and have considered them in determining the disclosure 
requirements that we should propose in this release."162 Public 
concern over the potential burden resulted in the SEC declining to 
recommend a specific format for the disclosure materials, opting 
instead to let each company determine the appropriate format. 163 In 
addition, there is no requirement for duplicative disclosures where 
information overlaps. 164 
The information required to be disclosed by companies wishing to 
utilize the CROWDFUND Act exemption fall into three broad 
categories: business and ownership information; company finances 
and the offering itself; and updates and ongoing reporting. 165 Within 
each of these groupings, the SEC has specifically addressed aspects 
of disclosure with the intent of easing the burden of meeting the 
requirements for small businesses. 166 Though the burden remains 
sizable for any small operation wishing to request capital via 
crowdfunding, especially with regard to company finances and the 
offering itself, it does not approach the cost associated with a 
traditional registered offering. 167 
161. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77d-l(b)(I)(I)(2012). 
162. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,438 (footnote omitted). 
163. ld. 
We expect, however, that an issuer, along with the intermediary, 
would determine the format that best conveys the required 
disclosures and any other information the issuer determines is 
material to investors. We recognize that there are numerous ways 
to achieve that goal and, as such, we are not proposing to mandate 
a specific disclosure format. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
164. Id. 
165. ld. 
166. See id. 
167. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the costs related to a 
traditional, non-exempt offering. 
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A. Business and Ownership Information 
Business and· ownership interest information consider three aspects 
of disclosure relating to the issuing company: officers, beneficial 
owners, and the company.168 
1. Officers 
One important piece of information for disclosure concerns the 
officers of the business issuing the securities. The SEC has proposed 
to define officers as they are defined under the Securities Act Rule 
405 and Exchange Act Rule 3b-2.169 Under these definitions, an 
issuer would be required to disclose information regarding its 
president, vice president, secretary, treasurer or principal financial 
officer, comptroller or principal accounting officer and any person 
routinely performing corresponding functions with respect to any 
organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to the extent it 
has individuals serving in these capacities. 170 
Disclosure of information relating to officers of the company 
would be for the previous three years, not the five years required 
under other types of offerings. 171 The SEC contends that this 
requirement of three years will be less burdensome and believes the 
firms undertaking crowdfunding will be smaller startups. 172 
However, the question remains whether a two-year difference in the 
outlying years provides much relief to small companies trying to raise 
capital in their first few years of operation. In practice, the difference 
between three years and five years would likely have only a minimal 
impact on the reporting burden. 173 
2. Beneficial Owners in Excess of 20 percent of Shares of Issuer 
Another important piece of information to be disclosed to 
prospective investors is that of beneficial owners. 174 Beneficial 
168. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,438-39. 
169. Id. at 66,438. An officer is defined as "a president, vice president, secretary, treasurer 
or principal financial officer, comptroller or principal accounting officer, and any 
person routinely performing corresponding functions with respect to any organization 
whether incorporated or unincorporated." 17 C.F .R. § 230.405 (2013). The Exchange 
Act Rule 3b-2 defines officers equivalently. ld. § 240.3b-2 (2013). 
170. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,438-39. 
171. Jd. at 66,439. Other offerings specifically referred to are registered offerings and 
offerings that are exempt under Regulation A. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 22, at 940~ I (discussing inevitable costs 
associated with the proposed rules arising from legal transition costs). 
174. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,439. 
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owners are those who own existing shares in the company prior to the 
current offering. 175 Under § 4A(b )(1 )(B), the issuer must disclose 
"the names of each person holding more than 20 percent of the shares 
of the issuer."176 Determination of these individuals is proposed as 
"the names of persons, as of the most recent practicable date, who are 
the beneficial owners of 20 percent or more of the issuer's 
outstanding voting equity securities, calculated on the basis of voting 
power. We refer to this group of persons as '20 Percent Beneficial 
Owners."'177 
According to the SEC, fixing the date as the most recent practicable 
date l78 would ensure that companies issuing shares under the 
exemption would not encounter a greater burden than companies 
issuing standard registered offerings. 179 Utilization of the most recent 
practicable date does ensure some uniformity with the existing 
standard for registered offerings. 180 However, the shift from 
reporting beneficial owners at the five-percent level to the twenty-
percent level appears to offer the most relief to the small business. It 
is more likely that there are fewer beneficial owners at the higher 
percentage associated with the crowdfunding exemption. 
3. Description of the Business 
The final disclosure relating to the overall business, located in § 
4A(b)(1)(C), is a description of the business itself in the form of a 
"business plan."181 This information is of great value to potential 
investors, whose interest in what the company plans to do and how it 
operates aids in the investment decision. Empirical evidence 
discussed in Part III.B established that one of the essential factors to a 
successful offering relates to information about the issuer.182 
However, small companies, and especially startups, would be wary of 




178. The use of the term "practicable date" mirrors similar usage under item 403 of 
Regulation S-K, which applies to registered offerings. 17 C.F.R. § 229.403 (2013). 
179. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,439. Standard registered offerings regulated under 
Regulation S-K require the furnishing of information as of the most recent practicable 
date of ownership interests of more than five percent of any class of voting securities. 
§ 229.403. 
180. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,439. 
181. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-l(b)(I)(C)(2012); Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,440. 
182. See supra Part III.B. 
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proprietary property. 183 In response to these concerns, the SEC 
proposed that the required "business plan" need not include internal 
management documents or marketing documents used for 
solicitation. 184 
B. Company Finances and the Offering 
While information relating to the offering itself is an important 
disclosure to investors, information about the company's finances 
and capital structure is equally important in ensuring that the investor 
has all of the relevant information to make an informed investment 
decision. 185 
1. Use of Proceeds 
One important piece of information relevant to the investor 
regarding the offering is the intended use of the proceeds raised 
through the offering. 186 Whether the funds are needed in order to pay 
off existing debt or other obligations versus investment in research 
and development can influence a potential investor's decision. 18? 
Capital funds raised through the offering may be used to acquire 
assets or other businesses, compensate intermediaries or employees, 
or repurchase some of the issuer's outstanding securities. 188 
How much information, and how detailed, relating to the use of the 
funds raised through the offering is left to the discretion of the 
issuer. 189 Rather than mandate a set form or minimal amount of 
required disclosure, the SEC requires only that some disclosure of the 
intended use of the proceeds be made. 190 While this does not free the 
issuer from the burden of making such disclosure, it does offer some 
flexibility in how much needs to be released and thus also in the size 
of the burden. 191 In many cases, a simple statement that the funds 
raised are for product development or talent acquisition may 
183. See Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1485-86. 
184. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,440. 
185. See id. at 66,437-38,66,440. 
186. 15 V.S.c. § 77d-l(b)(l)(E) (2012). 




191. See id. 
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suffice. l92 However, this lack of a formal requirement may leave the 
issuer vulnerable to an action by investors should problems arise. 193 
2. Target Offering Amount 
In addition to disclosing the intended use of the funds raised 
through the securities offering, the issuer must also disclose 
information relating to the target amount of funds desired. 194 The 
target amount is important both for investor's desire to know how 
much the company is trying to raise and to the likelihood of the 
offering being finalized; since the entire offering through the 
crowdfunding mechanism will only occur if the target amount is 
realized. 195 Should the company fail to raise the targeted amount, the 
entire transaction is canceled and all investor purchases for that 
offering are returned. 196 
In order to ensure that investors are fully informed, the SEC 
proposes that both the target amount of the offering as well as the 
maximum offering amount that the issuer will be accept be 
disclosed. 197 Thus, if the issuer has set their target amount at 
$150,000, but is willing to sell securities up to $500,000, the issuer 
must disclose both amounts. This is important, as an investor who 
believes he will have a certain percentage of shares based on the 
target amount may find his percentage reduced, possibly 
significantly, if enough investors are interested and the company is 
willing to sell more shares than targeted. 198 To this point, the SEC is 
also requiring the issuer to disclose their process for allocating shares 
in the event of an oversubscribed offering. 199 
Since there exists a possibility that the entire transaction may be 
canceled should the target amount not be met, the SEC proposes that 
a clear disclosure of the investors' right to cancel must be made. 20o 
As well, disclosure of the investors' need to reconfirm their 
192. See id. 
193. Under § 77d-l(c)(2), an issuer is liable for material misstatements and omissions. 15 
U.S.c. § 77d-l(c)(2) (2012). 
194. ld. § 77d-l(b)(l)(F). 
195. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,440-4l. 
196. ld. at 66,441. 
197. ld. at 66,440-4l. 
198. John S. Wroldsen, The Social Network and the Crowdfund Act: Zuckerberg, Saverin, 
and Venture Capitalists' Dilution of the Crowd, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 583, 616 
(2013). 
199. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,44l. 
200. ld. 
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commitment in certain situations is required. 201 Finally, the issuer 
must also disclose that, should the target amount not be reached, no 
securities will be sold and all commitments are canceled.202 While at 
first glance it may appear to require much from the issuer, the reality 
may be that once a standard is developed, the majority of issuing 
companies can simply use a generic set of statements. The burden of 
these disclosures is alleviated through the use of boilerplate 
descriptions of the processes, tailored to each specific offering. In its 
discussion of the proposed regulations, the SEC included a brief 
outline suggesting some items for inclusion in these disclosures. 203 
3. Offering Price 
As the offering is for a security interest in the issuing company, the 
price of the security must be disclosed to the investor.204 However, 
the price of the security may be based upon the number of shares sold 
or some other method.205 Therefore, the SEC has proposed that the 




As such, we propose to require issuers to describe the process to 
cancel an investment commitment or to complete the transaction 
once the target amount is met, including a statement that: 
• Investors may cancel an investment commitment 
until 48 hours prior to the deadline identified in the 
issuer's offering materials; 
• the intermediary will notify investors when the target 
offering amount has been met; 
• if an issuer reaches the target offering amount prior 
to the deadline identified in its offering materials, it 
may close the offering early if it provides notice 
about the new offering deadline at least five business 
days prior to that new deadline (absent another 
material change that would require an extension of 
the offering and reconfirmation of the investment 
commitment); and 
• if an investor does not cancel an investment 
commitment before the 48-hour period prior to the 
offering deadline, the funds will be released to the 
issuer upon closing of the offering and the investor 
will receive securities in exchange for his or her 
investment. 
ld. (footnotes omitted). 
204. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-l(b)(1)(G) (2012). 
205. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,457. 
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determining the price.206 Should the issuer disclose the method to be 
used in determining the offering price, rather than the price itself, the 
investor must then receive the final offering price in writing and all 
required disclosures prior to the sale.207 
4. Ownership and Capital Structure 
As discussed previously, the current ownership structure within the 
issuing company and the capital structure of the company are 
important considerations for the investor. 208 Section 4A(b)(1 )(H) 
specifies disclosures by the issuer relating to the terms of the 
securities issued; the effects of rights of existing shareholders on the 
securities offered; information about existing shareholders owning 
twenty percent or more of any class of the issuer's securities; how the 
offered securities are valued; and the risks associated with the 
securities offered.209 In addition to what is already required under the 
206. Id. at 66,441. 
207. Id. 
208. See supra Part III.B. 
209. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,44l. Section 77d-l(b)(I)(H) of the JOBS Act 
specifically states: 
[A] description of the ownership and capital structure of the 
issuer, including-
(i) tenns of the securities of the issuer being offered and 
each other class of security of the issuer, including how 
such tenns may be modified, and a summary of the 
differences between such securities, including how the 
rights of the securities being offered may be materially 
limited, diluted, or qualified by the rights of any other 
class of security of the issuer; 
(ii) a description of how the exercise of the rights held by 
the principal shareholders of the issuer could negatively 
impact the purchasers of the securities being offered; 
(iii) the name and ownership level of each existing 
shareholder who owns more than 20 percent of any class 
ofthe securities of the issuer; 
(iv) how the securities being offered are being valued, and 
examples of methods for how such securities may be 
valued by the issuer in the future, including during 
subsequent corporate actions; and 
(v) the risks to purchasers of the securities relating to 
minority ownership in the issuer, the risks associated with 
corporate actions, including additional issuances of 
shares, a sale of the issuer or of as- sets of the issuer, or 
transactions with related parties[.] 
15 U.S.C. § 77d-I(b)(I)(H) (2012). 
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regulation, the SEC proposes requiring additional disclosures 
including the number of securities being offered or those outstanding; 
whether or not the offered or existing securities have voting rights; 
any limitations on voting rights; and a discussion of any restrictions 
on transferring the securities.2lO The SEC notes that "[a]lthough 
Section 4A(b)(1)(H) does not specifically call for this disclosure, we 
believe that such disclosure would be necessary to provide investors 
with a more complete picture of the issuer's capital structure than 
would be obtained solely pursuant to the statutory requirements."211 
By adding these additional requirements, the SEC is "not proposing 
to prescribe content or format for this information, but rather to set 
forth principles of disclosure."212 
In an effort to ensure that investors are provided a "complete 
picture" of the issuer's existing capital, the SEC is also proposing 
additional requirements beyond those statutorily proscribed.213 
According to the SEC, disclosure of the name, Commission file 
number and Central Registration Depository number (CRD number) 
(where applicable) of the intermediary through whom the offering is 
being conducted should be required. 214 The SEC believes disclosure 
of these identifiers will aid investors in gathering information about 
the offering as well as background information on the intermediary.215 
The amount of compensation paid to the intermediary for 
conducting the offering should be disclosed including any referral or 
other expenses connected with the offering.216 This would inform the 
investor as to what portion of the proceeds from the offering will go 
to covering the cost of the offering, as well as provide a mechanism 
for monitoring these costs.217 
Finally, to aid the investor generally, the SEC also proposes: 
• disclosure of certain legends to be included in the 
offering statement;218 
• disclosure of the current number of employees of the 
Issuer; 
210. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,441-42. 
21l. ld. at 66,442. 
212. ld. at 66,444. 
213. ld. at 66,442. 
214. Jd. 
215. ld. Issuance of the CRD number comes from the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority, Inc. (FINRA) and not the SEC. ld. at 66,442 n.133. 
216. ld. at 66,442. 
217. ld. 
218. These legends will aid the investor in better understanding "the general risks of 
investing in a crowdfunding transaction." ld. 
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• a discussion of the material factors that make an 
investment in the issuer speculative or risky; 
• a description of the material terms of any 
indebtedness of the issuer, including the amount, 
interest rate, maturity date and any other material 
terms; 
• disclosure of exempt offerings conducted within the 
past three years; and 
• disclosure of certain related-party transactions.219 
155 
All of these additional proposed required disclosures fall under the 
SEC's authority provided by § 4A(b)(1)(I).220 
5. Financial Statements 
Under the crowdfunding exemption, issuers would be required to 
disclose company finances for the previous twelve-month period.221 
The amount of disclosure necessary follows a tiered approach based 
on the aggregate target offering amounts of the present offering and 
all other offerings in the prior twelve months. 222 In clarifying how to 
219. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
220. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b)(I)(I), 126 Stat. 
306,318 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-l(b)(l)(I) (2012)). "Section 4A(b)(l)(I) 
provides us with discretion to require crowdfunding issuers to provide additional 
information for the protection of investors and in the public interest." 78 Fed. Reg. at 
66,442 n.132. 
221. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-l(b)(I)(D) (2012). 
222. The tiered approach is specified as 
(D) [A] description of the fmancial condition of the issuer, 
including, for offerings that, together with all other offerings of 
the issuer under section 77d(6) of this title within the preceding 
12-month period, have, in the aggregate, target offering amounts 
of-
(i) $100,000 or less-
(I) the income tax returns filed by the issuer for 
the most recently completed year (if any); and 
(II) financial statements of the issuer, which 
shall be certified by the principal executive 
officer of the issuer to be true and complete in all 
material respects; 
(ii) more than $100,000, but not more than $500,000, 
financial statements reviewed by a public accountant who 
is independent of the issuer, using professional standards 
and procedures for such review or standards and procedures 
established by the Commission, by rule, for such purpose; 
and 
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calculate cumulative current and prior offering amounts, the SEC 
suggests the aggregate offering amount would only include those 
securities offered and sold.223 This attempts to keep down the cost to 
issuers whose prior crowdfunded offerings were unsuccessful, but 
prevents potential abuse in the form of structuring large offerings as a 
series of smaller offerings.224 
Specifically regarding the issuer's financial statements as required 
under § 4A(b)(I)(D), the SEC proposes 
a complete set of their financial statements (a balance sheet, 
income statement, statement of cash flows and statement of 
changes in owners' equity), prepared in accordance with 
U.S. generally accepted accounting principles ("U.S. 
GAAP") , covering the shorter of the two most recently 
completed fiscal years or the period since inception of the 
business.225 
The SEC views the two-year requirement as a compromise, citing 
one year as insufficient and three years as too burdensome on small 
issuers.226 Tax returns remain required under the proposed 
regulations, with privacy concerns addressed through redaction of 
personally identifiable information (e.g., social security numbers) by 
the issuer. 227 
For those issuers requiring review by a public accountant,228 the 
qualification of the independent public accountant should comply 
with Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X.229 This requirement will provide 
investors with confidence as to the reliability of the statements. 230 
The SEC refuses to increase the threshold for requiring audited 
financial statements to offerings greater than $500,000, as Congress 
specifically chose the existing $100,000 to $500,000 range. 231 "If we 
(iii) more than $500,000 (or such other amount as the 
Commission may establish, by rule), audited financial 
statements [ .] 
Id. (footnote omitted). 




227. Id. at 66,446. 
228. Review by a public accountant would be applicable to offerings of greater than 
$100,000 but less than $500,000. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-l(b)(I)(D)(ii) (2012). 
229. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,446. See Regulation S-X for specific requirements 
for qualification of accountants. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (2013). 
230. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,446. 
231. Id.at66,446-47. 
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were to raise the threshold to $1 million, as suggested by some 
commenters, it would eliminate the requirement for issuers ever to 
provide audited financial statements because the maximum offering 
amount under. Section 4( a)( 6) is $1 million. "232 
In addition to the numerical and accounting financial requirements, 
the SEC also proposes requiring the inclusion of a narrative 
discussion of the company's financial situation. 233 The purpose of 
this narrative is to reveal any prior operating history of the company 
not included in the other financial statements. 234 If no prior history 
exists, then the issuer should describe financial milestones as well as 
operational, liquidity, or other challenges. 235 
C. Updates and Ongoing Reporting 
Disclosure by the issuer is not confined to static information 
provided at the outset of the offering but also includes periodic 
updates and possible amendments to the offering. 236 These 
requirements produce an additional burden on the issuer wishing to 
utilize the exemption for crowdfunding.237 Under § 4A(b)(1)(F), the 
issuer must file updates as to their progress in meeting the targeted 
offering amount.238 The SEC has proposed that the filing of the 
update occur no later than five (5) days after particular intervals have 
been met (e.g. 50 percent and 100 percent of target).239 And, if the 
issuer is accepting a sale of securities in excess of their target 
amount, the issuer must file an update no later than five (5) days after 
the offering deadline that discloses the total amount of securities 
sold.240 One result of these update filings is to create a central 
repository for this information within the SEC.241 While the burden 
associated with these updates depends on the issuer and the specifics 
of each offering, the knowledge that such requirements exists may 
well affect a small business's decision to engage in crowdfunding as 
a means for raising capital. 
232. Id. at 66,447 (footnote omitted). 
233. Id. at 66,444. 
234. See id. 
235. Id. 
236. 15 U.S.c. § 77d-l(b)(I)(F) (2012). 
237. Other burdens include disclosure of business and ownership information, company 
finances, and information relating to the offering. See discussion supra Part IY.A-B. 
238. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,449; see also 15 U.S.c. § 77d-l(b)(1)(F) (2012). 
239. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,449. 
240. Id. 
241. Id. 
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1. Amended Offering Statement 
The SEC proposes to require that an issuer must file an amended 
offering statement whenever there is "any material change in the 
offer terms or disclosure previously provided to investors."242 This 
conforms to the desire to protect investors and make certain that they 
have all of the relevant information needed to properly evaluate the 
investment opportunity. A material change is one where "there is a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it 
important in deciding whether or not to purchase the securities."243 
Changes considered material include the issuer's financial condition, 
the intended use of the proceeds from the offering, and how the final 
price is determined in cases where only the method was initially 
disclosed.244 
2. Ongoing Reports 
Section 4A(b)(4) requires that the issuer file annual reports on 
operations and financial statements with the SEC and provide them to 
investors.245 Under the proposed rules, the issuer relying on the 
crowdfunding exemption would be required to file within "120 days 
after the end of the most recent fiscal year covered by the report. "246 
As for providing operations and financial reports to investors, the 
SEC proposes that the publication of an annual report on the 
company website would be sufficient, as it "believe[ s] that investors 
in this type of Internet-based offering would be familiar with 
obtaining information on the Internet and that providing the 
information in this manner would be cost-effective for issuers. "247 
The requirement for filing the annual report, which does create a 
burden particularly for a small company that previously had no public 
shareholders, would continue until one of three conditions is met.248 
242. Id. at 66,450. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. 
245. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(4) (2012). 
246. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,451. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. The three conditions are that 
(1) [t]he issuer becomes a reporting company required to file 
reports under Exchange Act Sections 13(a) or 15(d); (2) the issuer 
or another party purchases or repurchases all of the securities 
issued pursuant to Securities Act Section 4(a)(6), including any 
payment in full of debt securities or any complete redemption of 
redeemable securities; or (3) the issuer liquidates or dissolves its 
business in accordance with state law. 
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Annual report filing would cease when the issuer becomes a reporting 
company,249 the issuer or another buys all of the securities sold under 
the exemption, or the issuer dissolves or liquidates.25o 
D. Individual Investor Investment Cap 
In addressing the investment cap provided under § 4(a)(6)(B), the 
SEC acknowledged two practical aspects of the limitation.251 The 
first involves the calculation of the investment limit and concerns that 
under some scenarios an investor may be subject to two limits.252 
Because paragraph (i) and paragraph (ii) apply to "either" income or 
net worth, there is potential for an investor to be subject to both 
paragraphs.253 "[I]n [a] situation in which annual income is less than 
$100,000 and net worth is equal to or more than $100,000 (or vice 
versa), the language of the statute may be read to cause both 
paragraphs to apply."254 
In order to clarify the calculation of the investment limit, and avoid 
the scenario above, the SEC proposes to utilize the "greater of' the 
investor's annual income and net worth.255 "[I]f both annual income 
and net worth are less than $100,000," then the investor's limit would 
be $2,000 or five percent of annual income or net worth, whichever is 
greater.256 Where both annual income and net worth exceed 
$100,000, the limit would be the greater often percent of the annual 
income or net worth, not to exceed a limit of $100,000.257 Here, the 
SEC is enabling the appropriate application of the structural 
protection of investors. 258 
The second practical aspect of the investment limitation addressed 
by the SEC in their proposal was that of monitoring investor 
ld. 
249. A reporting company is one which is required to file reports under the Exchange Act 
§§ 13(a) or 15(d). Id. Section 13(a) covers issuers of securities registered on a 
national exchange under 15 U.S.c. § 781. ld. at 66,554; 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012). 
Section 15(d) covers registered brokers and dealers of securities. Crowdfunding, 78 
Fed. Reg. at 66,554; § 780. 
250. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,451. 
251. /d. at 66,433. 
252. Id. 
253. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B) (2012). 
254. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,433. 
255. Id. 
256. Id. (emphasis in original). 
257. Id. 
258. See supra Part III.C. 
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conformance with the limitation.259 Echoing the concerns raised by 
commenters regarding enforcement of the investment limitation,260 
the SEC proposes to place the burden of monitoring on the 
intermediaries.261 The SEC would "allow an issuer to rely on efforts 
that an intermediary takes in order to determine that the aggregate 
amount of securities purchased by an investor will not cause the 
investor to exceed the investor limits .... "262 This reliance, however, 
is subject to the issuer not having knowledge that the investor has 
already exceeded their limit or would do so under the transaction 
with the issuer.263 Having made this proposal, the SEC has asked 
specifically for comments on whether or not allowing reliance on the 
intermediary is appropriate.264 
Given the high number of transactions that intermediaries will 
handle in their role, it makes sense that they would ensure investor 
compliance with the limitation. If the intermediaries hold investor 
financial information, it would be appropriate for these intermediaries 
to develop a system by which investor compliance can be 
ascertained. Burdening the individual issuers with the task of making 
sure that each investor has not exceeded their investment limitation, 
and will not with the current transaction, will likely raise costs to the 
issuer. These increased costs from monitoring could outweigh the 
benefit of raising capital through crowdfunding. As such, the balance 
between investor protection and reasonable burdens on the issuer 
would be upset. 
V. CONCLUSION 
One of the purposes behind the JOBS Act, and the creation of an 
exemption for crowdfunding, was to institute a less costly means by 
which small businesses and startup companies could raise capital 
through issuing equity securities to the public.265 Decreased costs are 
associated with being exempt from the registration requirements that 
accompany traditional offerings of equity to the public, which entail 
substantial disclosure of information to investors.266 However, 
concern for investor protection and the potential for increased risk 
associated with the Internet require that disclosure of information to 
259. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,434. 
260. See supra text accompanying notes 144-146. 
261. Crowd funding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,434. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. 
264. Jd. at 66,434-35. 
265. See supra Part I. 
266. See supra Part II.B. 
2014 The CROWDFUND Act 161 
investors remains meaningful. 267 In addition, investors are protected 
by a limitation on the aggregate amount they may invest in 
crowdfunded securities.268 
The rules proposed by the SEC regarding disclosure by issuers 
under the CROWDFUND Act attempt to strike a balance between the 
burdensome disclosures for registered securities and a desire to 
protect the public investor. 269 Examining the information desired by 
investors, and relevant to their investment decision, reveals that the 
disclosures required under the CROWDFUND Act and those added 
by the SEC pertain to the very information investors seek.270 As 
such, despite the burdens associated with disclosing information 
about the company-its officers, shareholders, financial information, 
and periodic updates-a company wishing to raise capital through the 
selling of equity securities will certainly find a lower cost in utilizing 
the exemption for crowdfunding than in pursuing a more traditional 
public offering.271 Disclosure requirements, as determined under the 
SEC proposed rules, pose a lesser burden on the issuer, in part, due to 
the structural component of the limitation on aggregate investor 
purchases.272 As such, the cap on investors offsets the reduction in 
required disclosure.273 
There will always be costs for a company when trying to raise 
capital, and disclosure of information is essential to securing investor 
commitments.274 Through the CROWDFUND Act, and the rules 
proposed by the SEC, small businesses and startup companies will 
have a viable mechanism for raising capital from public offerings of 
equity via crowdfunding.275 
267. See supra Part lILA. 
268. See supra Part lILC. 
269. See supra Part lILC. 
270. Compare supra Part m.B (discussing the infonnation sought by investors), with Part 
IV.A-C (explaining the disclosures required under the SEC's proposed rules). 
271. This sterns from an exemption from additional requirements associated with a 
registered offering under the Securities Act. See supra Part II.B. 
272. See supra Part IILC. 
273. See supra Part III.C. 
274. Any attempt to raise capital requires some fees and charges simply to handle basic 
accounting and legal necessities. Some infonnation, however minimal, must be 
disclosed to investors in order to lead to a successful attempt at raising capital. See 
supra Part III.B. 
275. See supra Parts II.B., IV. 
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